CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DOSSIERS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES-Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970).
On April 23, 1969, Arthur J. Sills, the Attorney General of
New Jersey, distributed a memorandum entitled "Civil DisordersThe Role of Local, County and State Government" to all the local
law enforcement units of the state." Intended "to provide local officials
with information concerning the legal and practical ramifications of
handling civil disorders," 2 the Sills Memorandum was precipitated by
the 1967 disturbances that included some costly riots, and was promulgated pursuant to a conference between the Governor and the
mayors of New Jersey municipalities. It deals with many aspects of
the civil disorder problem, such as methods of advance planning,
mutual assistance between municipalities, summoning assistance from
the State Police and the National Guard, the legalities of proclaiming
an emergency, and the control of false rumors that might escalate
such a disorder.3 A small segment of the forty-three page communication, entitled "Potential Problems," describes the close working relationship that had developed between state and local authorities, and
the former's familiarity with the latter's problems. To facilitate continuing insight of central authorities, the municipalities are urged to
communicate "vital intelligence" requested in two security reports,
on a continuing and routine basis, so that it might be evaluated and
disseminated.

4

One security form is designed for reporting data relating to "incidents," such as civil disturbances, riots, rallies, protests, demonstrations, marches, confrontations, etc., and calls for the name of the
I Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 215, 265 A2d 678, 681 (1970). [The memorandum is
hereinafter referred to as the Sills Memorandum].
The recipients of the Sills Memorandum were independent local agencies outside the
Attorney General's official chain of command. Therefore, it was not a directive, regulation,
or order, but only a "communication." Id. The power "to preserve the public peace and
order and to prevent and quell riots, disturbances and disorderly assemblages" is primarily
with the local municipality. Since a failure to quell riots within its jurisdiction will
render the municipality liable to property owners for damages resulting from such riots,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:48-1 et seq. (Supp. 1969); A & B Auto Stores v. City of Newark, 106
N.J. Super. 491, 256 A2d 110 (L. Div. 1969), it is quite understandable that the local
agencies would do their utmost to cooperate with the state. Note, Municipal Liability
for Riot Damage, 16 HAST. L.J. 459 (1965).
2 Id. at 216 n.1, 265 A.2d at 681 n.l. See Momboisse, Riot Prevention and Survival,
45 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 143 (1969).
8 Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super. 545, 548, 256 A.2d 298, 299 (Ch. 1969).
4 Sills Memorandum at 19, quoted in Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. at 216-17, 265 A.2d
at 682.
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organization participating therein, the type of organization, and a
description of its involvement. The other form relates to individuals
and solicits comprehensive information describing them and their
activities in the occurrences.5
A number of adult citizens and the Jersey City Chapter of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) sued, individually and on behalf of a class similarly situated,
the Attorney General and local law enforcement officials, as individuals,
officials and representatives of the class of similar officials. A declaratory judgment that the use of such a reporting system violates the
United States Constitution and injunctive relief to prevent its continued use were sought. 6
When the Attorney General moved to dismiss the complaint for
failing to state a cause of action, the plaintiffs countered with a motion
for summary judgment.7 The Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery
Division, considered two primary issues,8 standing and constitutionality. The Attorney General contended that, since the plaintiffs did not
allege facts indicating that they had been aggrieved, they had no standing. Pointing out that the United States Supreme Court has relaxed
the standards of justiciability where it is alleged that governmental
action inhibits the exercise of first amendment rights, the court disposed of that argument. Judge Matthews observed that the standing
question was related to the substantive problem, whether the intelligence gathering system infringes on constitutional rights, and turned
his attention to the latter. 9
While admitting the validity of the government's concern over
the danger to life and property presented by civil disorders, and that
the Attorney General's objectives fell well within the established police
power, the court pointed out that
when a state official, in exercising his powers, comes in conflict
with those individual liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, it
5 Security Incident Reports (Form 420) and Security Summary Reports (Form 421)
and the accompanying instructions are reproduced in an addendum to the court's opinion
in Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. at 231-39, 265 A.2d at 690-96. For the highlights of the
report on individuals see Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super. at 552-53, 256 A.2d at 300.
6 Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super. 545, 547, 256 A.2d 298, 299.
7 Id. at 549, 256 A.2d at 300.
8 These questions were raised and discussed at length in Chilling Political Expression By Use of Police Intelligence Files: Anderson v. Sills, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGH'rs-Civ. LIB.
L. REV. 71 (1970), a comment concentrating on these two questions which was published
before the chancery division's decision was reversed and remanded.
9 106 N.J. Super. at 549-51, 256 A.2d at 300-01.
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is the delicate and difficult task of the courts to determine whether
the resulting restriction on freedom can be tolerated. 10
Before deciding the case, the court arrived at three concomitant
conclusions. First, the Attorney General did not show (in the Memorandum) how the information gathered would be helpful in preventing
civil disorders." In addition, the activities to be conducted by the
governmental authorities might reasonably be expected to interfere
with the exercise of first amendment rights. 12 Finally, the Sills Memorandum contravened the principles established in the overbreadth
and vagueness doctrines, in that individuals might be reluctant to
participate in legal activities for fear of being included in the data
bank and because its instructions could be too freely interpreted by
law enforcement officials.13 Judge Matthews held that
[t]he secret files . . .maintained as a result of this intelligence
gathering system are inherently dangerous and by their very existence tend to restrict those who would advocate, within the pro14
tected areas, social and political change.
Therefore, the court adjudged the completion, maintenance and
distribution of the forms under the Sills Memorandum to be violative
of the first amendment of the Constitution. The Attorney General
was directed to rescind his Memorandum and destroy all forms, files
and any information collected thereunder, except that data to be used
in charging people with specific criminal offenses.' 5
The decision precipitated an instantaneous and vigorous discussion among legal writers of conflicting viewpoints. Its conclusions were
defended, placed "on a more solid doctrinal footing,"' 16 and praised
as evidence of new standards of first amendment interpretation by
some writers, 17 while others attacked the reasoning as unique but
legally unsound.' 8 Perhaps this discussion was premature, for the
10 Id. at 552, 256 A.2d at 302.
11 Id. at 553, 256 A.2d at 302.
12 Id. at 554, 256 A.2d at 303, citing Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301
(1965), and Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
13 Id. at 556-57, 256 A.2d at 304, citing and discussing United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258 (1967).
14 Id. at 557, 256 A.2d at 305.
15 Id. at 557-58, 256 A.2d at 305.
16 Comment, supra note 8.
17 Askin, Police Dossiers and Emerging Principles of First Amendment Adjudication,
22 STAN. L. REV. 196, 220 (1970). Professor Frank Askin participated in preparing the
plaintiffs' briefs.
18 Comment, Secret Files: Legitimate Police Activity or Unconstitutional Restraint
on Dissent?, 58 GEo. L.J. 569 (1970):
Anderson v. Sills is the first case to enjoin police information gathering per se,
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Supreme Court of New Jersey, after certifying the matter before the
appeal to the appellate division was argued, reversed and remanded
the case. 19 In a unanimous opinion, the court held that the trial court
should have refused to grant the summary judgment because "[t]he
constitutional issue was presented in a hypothetical way within an aura
of surmise and speculation,"2 0 and the trial record was inadequate for
a decision upon the merits.

21

Chief Justice Weintraub characterized as "hypothetical horribles"
the plaintiffs' visions of first amendment right violations by a widespread harassment of citizens participating in constitutionally protected conduct. "There is not an iota of evidence that anything of the
kind has occurred or will, or that any person has been deterred by that
'22
prospect.
The court's opinion contravened the reasoning of the chancery
division, especially in its treatment of the areas covered by the latter's
three preliminary conclusions. As to the first requirement that the
Attorney General show in his Memorandum the usefulness of the
information in preventing civil disorders, the court stated:
Nor should an injunction issue on the assumption that there
will be unwarranted police action because a judge cannot on the
basis of his own experience understand the relevancy of the . . .

items plaintiffs stress in their academic attack. Law enforcement
is a specialty, and its needs may not be within the expertise of a
court. That is why a hearing is essential for an informed decision
in a case of this kind. It may well be that a hearing will establish
that some of these items are wholly unrelated to the police obligation with respect to anyone involved in any type of incident, but
this is so. We cannot know how
we should not merely assume 2that
3
little we know until we listen.
As for the contention that the governmental activities might
interfere with first amendment rights, the court first pointed out the
lack of evidence that the Memorandum was intended by the Attorney
General or interpreted by local officials to call for any action that
invaded a constitutionally protected area.2 4 Emphasizing that court interference with measures adopted by the executive branch to protect
the citizenry is a serious affair, the chief justice reiterated the court's
without regard to the manner which it is to be employed; the mere scope of the
information sought was deemed to transgress constitutional limits.
Id. at 571.
19 Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 200, 231, 265 A.2d 678, 689.
20 Id. at 215, 265 A2d at 681.
21

Id.

22

Id. at 218, 265 A.2d at 682.

28

Id. at 225-26, 265 A.2d at 687.
Id. at 220, 265 A.2d at 683.

24
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unwillingness to do so on the strength of a hypothetical statement of
constitutional problems.
Rather the premise must be accepted, absent proof the other way,
that the Memorandum assumed a lawful exercise of the judgment
and discretion vested in the local police. The Memorandum did not
originate the duty of the local police unit to decide what situations
harbor the potential of disaster and what data should be gathered
for responsible performance in office.
The forms do not enlarge
25
upon that power and responsibility.
That a "chilling effect" on speech or association might occur was
regarded to be of subsidiary importance. Instead, the pivotal question
was regarded to be the legality of the activity, although the amount of
"chill" might be relevant to that issue. First amendment rights must
be weighed against competing interests. "If a properly drawn measure
is within the power of government, it is no objection that the exercise
of speech or association is thereby 'chilled.' ",26
The court cited cases upholding investigative powers of the legislature, administrative bodies, and grand juries to support similar
powers of the police. In fact, the preventive role of the police was
perceived to require even wider investigative responsibilities and
27
authority for them.
With regard to the overbreadth and vagueness problems, the court
observed that "[w]e are not dealing with a statute imposing criminal
liability for its violation .... ,,2s Unlike a statute, the Memorandum
neither imposes restrictions on a citizen nor requires a police officer
to take action against a citizen. Instead of commanding, it provides
information, advice and encouragement. Although first amendment
problems can arise elsewhere than under statutes, regulations, or directives, "it would be unreasonable to require that intragovernmental
communications be drafted with a precision the Constitution demands
of a legislative enactment." 29 It is arguable that the framer of the
Memorandum could have assumed that police authorities were aware
of the restrictions on their power.8 0
The gathering of information was found to be essential to the
prevention of criminal activity, a police function as important as the
25 Id. at 225-26, 265 A.2d at 686-87.

Id. at 226-27, 265 A.2d at 687.
Id. at 227-28, 265 A.2d at 687-88. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187
(1957) (legislative investigatory power); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964)
(administrative agency investigatory power); In re Addonizio, 53 N.J. 107, 123-27, 248
A.2d 531, 541-43 (1968) (grand jury investigatory power).
28 56 N.J. at 220, 265 A.2d at 684.
29 Id. at 221, 265 A.2d at 684.
80 Id.
26
27
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investigating of past criminal events. There must be an awareness of
tension and preparations, as well as of the existent forces. In fact, the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders encouraged information gathering activitiesA1 Refusing to strike down such activities on
the basis of "mere abstraction," 32 the court decided that
[t]he basic approach must be that the executive branch may
gather whatever information it reasonably believes to be necessary
to enable it to perform the police roles, detectional and preventive.
A court should not interfere in the absence of proof of bad faith or
arbitrariness. 33
Perhaps the theme of the opinion is best stated in the court's own
words:
Lawlessness has a tyranny of its own, and it would be folly to
deprive government of its power to deal with that tyranny merely
because 4of a figment of a fear that government itself may run
amuck.3
As for the plaintiffs' standing, the scant but favorable treatment
by the supreme court denotes approval of the disposition of that issue
35

below.

This discussion will focus upon the constitutional issue highlighted by the conflicting opinions of the two courts, namely, whether
the information collection and dissemination system created by the
Sills Memorandum is inherently unconstitutional. May the state utilize
a system that does not contain its own safeguards to prevent its use in
constitutionally protected areas? Throughout this treatment, the two
conflicting social interests will constantly appear: (1) a democratic society demands freedom of thought and exchange of ideas in order to
function; and (2) some degree of public tranquility is necessary so that
the citizenry can be secure in person and property.
CONSTITUTIONALLY

PROTECTED CONDUCT

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. 36
31 Id. at 222-23, 265 A.2d at 684-85.

Id. at 226, 265 A.2d at 687.
Id. at 229, 265 A.2d at 688.
34 Id., 265 A.2d at 689.
35 Id. at 220, 265 A.2d at 683-84.
36 U.S. Const. amend. I, see generally Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment
32
33

1970]

NOTES

This restraint upon the federal government has been held fully
applicable to the states.8 7 In Anderson v. Sills, the plaintiffs championed "first amendment rights-to protest, demonstrate, rally, march,
etc."8' 8 These are derived from the specified rights of free speech and
assembly as well as the implied rights of free association, access to a
forum and privacy embodied within the Bill of Rights. 39
There are vital distinctions between "pure" speech, the verbalization of ideas and thoughts, and "symbolic conduct" or "speech-plus,"
combinations of speech and conduct. 40 Although the first amendment
affords more protection to the former, both types of activities are
protected from blanket prohibitions and abridgments. 41 Group activities, such as demonstrations, picketing and protests must be conducted
42
in conformance with reasonable governmental regulations.
It is now beyond dispute that an individual's right of free association is protected by the first amendment. 43 It is closely related
to the rights to believe as one chooses, to have a privacy in those
Mean?, 20 U. CHi. L. REV. 461 (1953); Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
37 See generally Annot., 18 L. Ed. 2d 1388 (1967); and Annot. 23 L. Ed. 2d 985
(1969). The same standards apply to both federal and state governments. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
38 Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Anderson v.
Sills, 106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A.2d 298 (Ch. 1969).
39 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 358,
364-65 (1937), stating that the right of peaceful assembly is cognate to those of free
speech and press and equally fundamental to the concept that government can be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by peaceful means
only when opportunities for free political advocacy and discussion exist. See Schact v.
United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
See generally Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 CoLuM. L. REV. 1361 (1963); Horning,
The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DUKE L.J. 931; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 1.
40 Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1091 (1968); Askin, supra note 17,
at 199-200.
41 Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, 80 HARV. L. Rzv. 1773 (1967). See Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
42 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969); Gregory v. City
of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118 (1969) (concurring opinion); cf. Dejonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 364 (1937). See also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 38 (1968) wherein Justice
Douglas (concurring) states:
The right of association is one form of "orderly group activity" (NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430), protected by the First Amendment.
43 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960). In Talley, the Supreme Court
held that a municipal ordinance making it a criminal offense to distribute "any handbill
in any place under any circumstances," unless it had printed on it the names and
addresses of the persons who prepared, distributed or sponsored it was void on its face.
The Court stated "that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom
to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression." Id. at 64.
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beliefs, and the freedom to communicate them to others while remaining anonymous. These rights create a shield of anonymity that allows
minority thinkers to freely express their viewpoints to people who can
freely listen. Such protection is necessary because of the understand44
able fears of being identified with unorthodox or unpopular opinions.
Without this anonymity, many express rights in the Constitution lose
45
their meaning.
STATE INTEREST

There is a state interest in the prevention of civil disorders.
Society and its government must be protected from chaos that would
threaten the security necessary for democracy. 46 Likewise, government
is obligated to protect the citizenry from crime. 47 Prevention of future
crime, as distinguished from the detection of past criminal acts, requires that the state be able to investigate illegal activities and associations.

48

Even first amendment rights must be regulated to some extent
44 Boorda v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 421 F.2d 1142, 1147 (D.C. Cir.
1969), citing United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967) and Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960). See Douglas, supra note 39 at 1363, quoting from de
Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America 20 (Bradley ed. 1954):
The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for himself,
is that of combining his exertions with those of 'his fellow creatures and of
acting in common with them. The right of association therefore appears to me
almost as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty. No legislator
can attack it without impairing the foundations of society.
45 Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB.
253, 260 (1966). This right of anonymity has never been specifically articulated in conjunction with the exercise of first amendment freedoms, but a line of cases certainly
emphasizes a right to join and participate in controversial yet lawful associational group
activity without restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. See Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 US. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). "The reason for
those holdings was that identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful
discussions of public matters of importance." Talley v. California, 362 US. 60, 65 (1960).
It has been asserted that the rights to full expression and association often depend upon
the power of individuals to control the flow of information concerning or describing them.
Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age-The Challenge of a New Technology in
an Information Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L REv. 1091 (1969); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE
L.J. 475 (1968). The common law right of privacy has its roots in doctrines developed in
the law of contracts, property, and torts. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 H~av. L. REV. 193 (1890); A. Westin, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1958).
46 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). The government has a right
to collect information about subversives and subversive activities that would destroy the
present system.
47 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 US. 1 (1968).
48 See Moreland, Congressional Investigations and Private Persons, 40 S. CAI. L.
REV. 189 (1967).
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to protect the tranquility of our society. 49 The government is empowered to prevent violent or imminently violent picketing or mass
demonstrations to achieve that end. 50 But undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance does not justify restriction of the freedom
of expression. 51
PROTECTED CONDUCT V. STATE INTEREST

The problem facing the courts in all first amendment litigation
has been the reconciliation of the guaranteed freedoms of speech and
association with the legitimate and necessary governmental activities.

The two concepts inherently collide. In attempting to adjudicate this
issue, the United States Supreme Court has employed various tests.
The "clear and present danger" test was important in the postWorld War I period.52 More recently, the "balancing" test has been
employed. 58 This method of reconciliation was defined in Dennis v.
United States,54 and stated concisely in American Communications
Association v. Dowds:
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public
order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial
abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which
of the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection
under the particular circumstances presented. 55

This test has been criticized due to seemingly inconsistent applications,
which can be found in factually similar cases. 56 It has been asserted
49 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (license requirement for a parade on a
public highway); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (prohibiting sound trucks in residential areas at night).
50 Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1957); Milk Wagon Drivers
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941) (both cases dealt with enjoining union picketing).
51 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). See Terminello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
52 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See Antieau, The Rule of Clear
and Present Danger-Its Origin and Application, 13 U. DET. L.J. 198 (1950); Z. Chafee,
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, 80-140 (1941).

53 See, eg., Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 US. 72, 80 (1959).
54 341 US. 494 (1951). The Court adopted the statement of Chief Judge Learned
Hand in the opinion below. Id. at 510:
In each case (courts) must ask whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted by
its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger. [Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).]
55 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950). See also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126
(1959).
56 Emerson, supra note 36, at 912-14; Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance,
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that United States v. Robel 57 was the culmination of a series of cases
that eroded the "balancing" test to such a degree that it is now meaningless notwithstanding the fact that its words are still mouthed. 58
In fact the Robel Court expressly declined to utilize that test in the
matter at bar. 9
Justice Black has viewed the first amendment to mean that the
government cannot regulate protected speech merely because it is
related to unprotected activity; it can only regulate the latter when
it stands alone. 60 This view, called the "absolutist test," 61 has not yet
been expressly adopted by a majority of the Court. A new test was
formulated in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Commission,62 wherein the state was not allowed to intrude on constitution-

ally protected areas, absent a convincing showing of an overriding
and compelling state interest.
This reconciliation of conflicting interests, a difficult task in
itself, will not even be attempted unless a relationship can be estab63
lished between the restriction and a valid governmental interest.
If there is no such relationship, or "nexus," even the most crucial
state interest could not support the infringement since the interest
is not furthered by it.
71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Political
Freedom, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 4, 7-14 (1961).
57 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
58 Askin, supra note 17, at 207-10, citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965); Bagget v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
59 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967):
It has been suggested that this case should be decided by "balancing" the
governmental interests . . . against the First Amendment rights asserted by the
appellee. This we decline to do.
60 See Askin, supra note 17, at 209.
61 Comment, supra note 18, at 573. Justice Black's logic is expressed in his dissenting
opinion in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143 (1959):
To apply the Court's balancing test . . . is to read the First Amendment to
say "Congress shall pass no law abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly
and petition, unless Congress and the Supreme Court reach the joint conclusion
that on balance the interest of the Government in stifling these freedoms is
greater than the interest of the people in having them exercised."
62 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
63 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968):
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest
(emphasis added).
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127-28 (1959); accord, Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 Us.
516, 525 (1960).
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Two additional concepts restrict the government's enacting of
measures which curtail fundamental rights. A statute will be declared "overbroad" when it prohibits the free exercise of constitutional rights, not only of those people intended to be affected, but also
of those not so intended.6 4 Moreover, if such protected activities are to
be regulated, the legislation must be carefully aimed at the specific
area to be forbidden.6 5 "Vague" statutes raise a closely related problem in failing to clearly delineate the prohibited area to obviate
uncertainty as to the legality of borderline activities. 66 Such an enactment tends to be overly restrictive in that most people avoid questionable conduct. 67 If a measure has either of those characteristics, the
Court will strike it down.6
CHILLING EFFECT

The harmful effect of a vague or overly broad statute has been
termed "chilling effect." 69 Although those words were not used, at
least one writer thoroughly understood the concept as early as 1831:
When some kinds of associations are prohibited and others allowed,
it is difficult to distinguish the former from the latter beforehand.
In this state of doubt men abstain from them altogether, and a sort
of public opinion passes current which tends to cause any association what-so-ever to be regarded as a bold and almost illicit enter70
prise.
In Dombrowski v. Pfister,71 the Supreme Court granted injunctive relief to the petitioners who were threatened with criminal pros64 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941). In Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966), and Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961), the Supreme Court ruled that when a "quasi
political party" or other group embraced both legal and illegal aims, affiliation with
and membership in that group were constitutionally protected except for those who
join with the specific intent to further illegal action.
65 Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118 (1969) (concurring opinion). See
generally, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970);
McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1182 (1959).
66 Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
67 Unenforced laws have been held to have a deterrent effect because they restrain
the conscientious citizen who believes that it is his obligation to obey the law. See
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940); United Steelworkers of America v. Bagwell, 383 F.2d 492, 496 (4th Cir. 1967).
68 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
69 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
70 See Douglas, supra note 39, at 1379, quoting from de Tocqueville, 2 DEMocaAcY

IN AMERICA
71

125 (Bradley ed. 1954).

380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ecution under subversive activity and communist propaganda control
laws. Despite the invalidation of previous arrests and records seizures
by state courts, the petitioners and their supporters, all active in the
civil rights movement, were repeatedly subjected to harassment under the same statutes. The Court struck down sections of the enactments, reasoning that their susceptibility to sweeping and improper
application had an unconstitutional "chilling effect" on first amendment rights. 72 The logic of NAACP v. Button 73 was utilized, namely
that the threat of criminal sanctions may deter the uninhibited,
74
robust debate envisioned by the framers of the first amendment,
75
almost as effectively as their application.
Although Dombrowski involved statutory measures that were
void either inherently or in their application, its reasoning was later
applied in cases dealing with bad faith prosecutions under valid
enactments. 76 Its rationale has also been applied where legislative investigations or pronouncements required organizations to disclose
the identity of their members or individuals to reveal their associational ties.7 7 The Court has protected legal organizations and relationships, utilizing the "chilling effect" doctrine.
Moreover, it has been held that loyalty oaths must be drawn so
that they do not preclude prospective public employees from maintaining relationships that are questionable, but not illegal. 78 One must
not be forced to guess what conduct, utterance or affiliation might
preclude him from government employment, since he will probably
79
steer unduly far wide of the circumscribed area.
The "chilling effect" concept of Dombrowski, although unenunciated at the time, includes the policy reasons stated in a case which
revised two procedural doctrines in constitutional law. In McNeese
v. Board of Education,8 0 a school segregation suit, the Court eliminated the abstention and exhaustion doctrines as bars to suits under
the Civil Rights Act,81 holding that a litigant need not exhaust all
Id. at 486.
78 371 US. 415 (1963).
74 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
75 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
76 Eg., United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 740-41 (5th Cir. 1967).
77 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 885
U.S. 589, 604, 609 (1967); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 872 U.S.
539, 544 (1963).
78 See Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967).
79 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
80 873 U.S. 668 (1963).
si 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
72
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available state or administrative remedies as a condition precedent
to the granting of extraordinary relief in a federal court.82 In this
context, a "chilling effect" exists when there is a need to resort to
protracted state administrative procedures before a fundamental and
protected right can be exercised.
This variety of examples highlights the usefulness of the broad
rule that prevents governmental measures from checking truly undesirable activities, if legal activities are likewise curtailed.
DOSSIERS AND

CIVIL LIBERTIES: Anderson v. Sills

In deciding that the system espoused by the Sills Memorandum
was not inherently unconstitutional, the New Jersey Supreme Court
stated that the "chilling effect" was not the pivotal issue.83 Rather, the
court said, the issue is "whether the activity is legal", although it
admitted the possible relevancy of the "amount of chill" to that is84
sue.
It is submitted that the court erred in underestimating the "chilling effect" inherent in the controversial system. Under it, police can
conduct surveillances of legal activities in order to collect data that
will later be collated, stored, and disseminated. The magnitude of the
"chilling effect" problem is obvious on those facts alone. Undeniably,
people wishing to participate in peaceful picketing or other legal activities might forego them rather than be the subject of a police file.
Potential abuses of the system are easily imagined. No guarantee
that the information compiled under it will not become available to
other parties is sufficient. If even the existence of such a file were
known by unauthorized individuals, the possibilities for harmful results would abound 5 Moreover, the broad scope of the forms themselves implies that additional investigation may be not only permitted,
but encouraged.88 Would it not be seriously harmful to have police
authorities seek information from an individual's bank or employer?
The forms are designed for data which probably can only be obtained from such sources.8 7 When it is recalled that all this might
82 McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 US. 668 (1963); cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 183 (1961).
83 56 N.J. at 226, 265 A.2d at 687.
84 Id.
85 Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored

PersonalData, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 342, 365-71 (1966).
88 See 56 N.J. at 231-39, 265 A.2d at 690-96.
87 E.g., Occupation, Employer/Business, Employer's Address, Associates, Financial/
Credit status.
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ensue from legal activities, the magnitude of the unfairness appears
staggering.
To support its statement that "[i]f a properly drawn measure is
within the power of government, it is no objection that the exercise
of speech or association is thereby 'chilled' ",,s the court cited Cameron v. Johnsonsa and United States v. O'Brien.90 The "chilling effect"

in those cases was incidental to regulations for which a "nexus" had
already been established. Moreover, the "chill" was indirect in that
the thrust of the regulations was impersonal.
A direct and personal "chilling effect" constitutes a substantial
infringement of first amendment rights.9 ' If the state is to prevail, it
must show that its activity meets the following requirements: (1)
legitimate state objectives,9 2 (2) "a reasonable relationship to the
achievement of the governmental purpose asserted as its justification",9

3

(3) a lack of alternative means of attaining the state objec-

94

tive, and (4) a narrowly drawn scheme directed only at the activity
sought to be prevented. 95
The New Jersey Supreme Court avoided the nexus requirement
by observing that an injunction could not issue "on the assumption
that there will be unwarranted police action because a judge cannot
on the basis of his own experience understand the relevancy" of
some of the information. For
[l]aw enforcement is a specialty, and its needs may not be within
the expertise of a court. That is why a hearing is essential for an

informed decision in a case of this kind. It may well be that a hearing will establish that some of these items are unrelated. . . , but we

should not assume that this is so. We cannot know how little we
know until we listen.
Such a statement contravenes the requirement that the state
prove the relationship between its actions and a valid state interest.
If such proof was found by the court, there is no allusion to it.
There should certainly be no presumption that participants in organized demonstrations are likely to engage in criminal acts. The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders stated:
88 56 N.J. at 227, 265 A2d at 687.
89 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
90 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
91 See notes 67 thru 82 supra, and accompanying text.
92 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960).
93 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 525 (1960).
94 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (concurring opinion).
95 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967).

1970]

NO TES

On the basis of all the information collected the Commission
concludes that the urban disorders of 1967 were not caused by, nor
were they -he consequence of, any organized plan or "conspiracy."
Specifically, the Commission has found no evidence that ali or any
of the disorders or the incidents that led to them were planned or
directed by any organization or group, international, national or
local. 96
If that is the case, what is the purpose of the intelligence gathering
system established under the Sills Memorandum?
If a sufficient case has not already been stated, the court's point
that the Sills Memorandum is not a statute so that it need not be
drawn with the precision demanded of the latter can be described
as less than meaningful. Words taken from the opinion make this
evident: "[T]he Memorandum imposes no liability or obligation or
restriction whatever upon the citizen."9 7 But this premise is incorrect; the scope of the information sought in the memorandum produces a direct "chill" on those legally wishing to take part in protests
or demonstrations. The chill is as present as if the memorandum
were a statute.
It is submitted that the critical questions to be answered in
determining the constitutionality of the scheme on trial in Anderson
are whether the "chilling effect" was so substantial as to infringe on
first amendment rights, and whether the state must show a "nexus"
between the scheme and the prevention of civil disorders. The answer to both must be a resounding "yes."
Howard C. Trueger
96 56 N.J. at 222-23, 265 A.2d at 689. See Note, Black Power Advocacy: Criminal
Anarchy or Free Speech, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 702 (1968) which critically analyzed the theory
that outside agitators "cause" riots. The Note analyzed over 100 ghetto disturbances
during the period July, 1964 to September, 1967. The conclusion was that in over 93%
of the riots inflammatory advocacy was not present. In another 3% advocacy was not a
factor, and in the remaining 4% other mediating factors made it difficult to prove a
causal connection between the advocacy and the violence.
97 56 N.J. at 221, 265 A.2d at 684.

